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  With the global events of technological advancement and mass migration, the 
prominence of terrorist incidents and subsequent media coverage is garnering more and more 
attention. The existing literature on populist communication and population responses to terrorist 
events indicate a potential correlation between characteristic changes in online political 
communication by right-wing parties and the occurrence of terrorist events. Terror Management 
Theory (TMT) and sense-making suggest that a population would be more susceptible to 
political messaging and anti-immigration agenda setting following a terrorist attacks. I use a big-
data study of Tweets in Germany from the years 2013-2019 in order to test whether or not this 
correlation exists. I conclude that there is no statistically significant evidence that shows that 
terrorist events affect either the frequency of immigration-related Tweets or the sentiment 
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The rise in high-profile terrorist attacks in Western Europe over the past 10 years has led 
to populist, right-wing parties employing strategies that revolve around the capitalization of mass 
threat perception of immigrants. When the wave of terrorist attacks in the mid-2010’s overlapped 
in time with the so-called Migration Crisis1 in Europe, the anti-immigrant sentiment among most 
Western European countries began to rise (Larsson, Cutts & Goodwin 2020). This rise can be 
attributed to increased emotions manifesting as anxiety and a heightened sense of threat 
perception, which in turn leads to excessive stereotyping (Engesser, Fawzi & Larsson 2017; 
Ferrín, Mancosu & Capialli 2020). This stereotyping can lead individuals to become more fearful 
and suspicious of threats from a certain perceived “outgroups'' causing them to alter their actions 
(like policy preferences and voting habits) in an attempt to ensure their personal security 
(Mancosu & Ferrín Pereira 2020; Kim 2015).  
In this paper, I study Tweets made by official accounts2 of the German right-wing party,  
Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)3, on the social media platform Twitter to determine if and 
how terrorist attacks change the quantity and sentiment of immigration-related Tweets made by 
the AfD. I expect there to be a strong correlation between the frequency of negative Tweets and 
                                               
1 Also known as the Refugee Crisis, the years 2014-2019 saw an unprecedented number of displaced persons seek 
refugee in the European Union by way of overland means and via the Mediterannean Sea. Many of these individuals 
came from war-torn countries, and were seeking asylum.  
 
2 Full list of Twitter handles and corresponding account names can be found in Appendix 1 
 
3 The AfD was officially founded in 2013. In 2014, the party won seats for the first time in the European Parliament. 
By the end of 2017, the AfD was represented in 14 of the 16 federal states in Germany, and became the third largest 
party in the German Bundestag. The past eight years have seen the AfD transition from a primarily anti-EU party to 
one that is first and foremost, an anti-immigration party.  
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terrorist events. The opportunity window presented by such emotional reactions to 
terrorist events suggests that far-right parties would be primed to take advantage of this 
opportunity by inundating social media spheres with public statements reaffirming constituents’ 
fears (Garcia & Rime 2019). Available research has already established the high usage of social 
media platforms by populist parties for information dissemination (Gerbaudo 2018; Gil de 
Zúñiga, Michaska & Römmele 2020; Engesser, Ernst, Esser & Büchel 2016). Another body of 
literature addresses population response to terrorist events at both the psychological and policy 
levels (Jonas, Martens, Niesta Kayser, et.al. 2008; Juhl & Routledge 2016). I hope to add to the 
available literature addressing the advent of social media in conjunction with the advent of 
terrorist attacks.  
Even more specifically, there is a lack of literature revolving around populist parties’ 
social media reactions to terrorist events - much of the current literature focuses on population 
reaction. In the subsequent sections of this paper, I seek to address some of the issues, by sharing 
insights from a big-data study. I expect that the AfD’s desire to exploit terrorist events would be 
visible in an increase in both social media presence and in derogatory language used therein in 
order to promote an anti-immigration agenda.  
In this paper, I rely on psychological reactions to explain why AfD accounts would have 
a noticeable change in their Twitter presence and dialogue following terrorist events. This study 
uses empirical analysis to show when AfD accounts increase the quantity of immigration-related 
Tweets, as well as computer-driven content analysis to characterize the Tweets as negative or 
positive and determine how much emotional content is present within. These Tweets can then be 
juxtaposed with terrorist events during the years 2013-2019. This list has been compiled from the 





comparison: the first takes “major terror events” which I categorize as having 10+ casualties 
(injuries or deaths) in Western Europe, while the second takes “German events” which have 1+ 
casualties and happened within Germany. When analyzed in this way, I am able to draw a 
number of conclusions about the changing nature and quantity of AfD Tweets following terrorist 
events. I present a series of graphs that offer insight into potential relationships between terrorist 
events and immigration-related Tweets, as well as formal regression models and statistics that 






CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND KEY CONCEPTS 
Terrorism  
 Terrorism, as defined by the Global Terrorism Database, is “the threatened use of illegal 
force or violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal 
through fear, coercion, or intimidation4”. For inclusion in the database, an incident had to meet 
three criteria: intentionality, some level of violence or threat of violence, and sub-national actors 
as perpetrators. 
Furthermore, the incident must have met two of the additional three criteria for inclusion: 
the act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal; There must be 
evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience 
(or audiences) than the immediate victims; The action must be outside the context of legitimate 
warfare activities. 
  For the purposes of this paper, I refer to a terrorist event as any entity within the Global 
Terrorism Database that was initially coded as 0 for the categorical variable “doubtterr”, which 
assures that there was “essentially no doubt” as to whether or not the incident could be classified 
as terrorism. 
                                               
4 This definition, as well as the subsequent information on criteria, is found on the GTD website which can be found 
here: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.  
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Putting it Together: Terrorist Attacks Provide the Perfect Window of Opportunity 
The publicly-available body of information on why and how populist parties use social 
media platforms is quite extensive, but there is not as much literature on when populist parties 
double-down on their social media usage. Berry and Sobieraj (2014) suggest that populist parties 
also tend to appeal to emotion and “outrage” in order to mobilize their voting bases. 
Vasilopoulos, Valentino, Marcus & Foucault (2019) show that emotions are most manipulable in 
a heightened state. To this end, populist parties can hijack this moment of emotional 
vulnerability in order to promote a political agenda. By taking advantage of heightened 
emotional states of constituents during a time fraught with fear, anxiety, and a need for world 
order that upholds cultural worldviews, a party can sway a voter or reinforce negative 
stereotypes by assuring individuals that their policies and ideologies will ensure personal security 
in the future.  
As it applies to this case, the AfD can use Twitter to inundate followers' feeds with anti-
immigration messaging following terrorist events in order to reinforce the ideas of stereotyping, 
threat perception, and community-building among individuals who fear cultural worldviews that 
may be at odds with their own. This phenomenon is summed up by Vasilopoulos, Marcus, 
Valentino, and Foucault:  
“far‐right parties stoke anxiety, especially among authoritarian‐minded citizens by 
presenting economic downturns, cultural change, and both domestic and international security 





CHAPTER 2: HYPOTHESIS – TWITTER’S FUNCTION IN THE AFTERMATH OF 
TERRORIST ATTACKS  
Increased Quantity 
According to both Terror Management Theory and sense-making theories, there is an 
increased draw to social media following terrorist events due to an individual’s need to find a 
place of belonging, security, and shared identity to make sense of confusing, violent, and 
disrupting times (García & Rimes 2019). On social media, the hashtag (#) function allows for 
like-minded individuals to quickly and easily spread emotional sentiment, as well as search for 
individuals who share their worldviews (Eriksson 2016). By “hashtagging” a word or phrase, an 
individual Tweet or post is automatically hyperlinked to a repository containing posts with the 
same hashtag. These hashtags can further collectivize sense-making and provide an easy way for 
individuals to find a like-minded community which eases the process of sense-making and 
reinforces the hypothesis of Terror Management Theory (Eriksson 2016).  
This not only makes it easier for individuals to seek out specific information, but also 
contributes to individuals seeking out and only getting information that confirms previously held 
beliefs. In turn, this directly contributes to the willingness of individuals to seek compatriots in 
social media spheres due to the knowledge that they have easy-access to people and thoughts that 
make them feel more secure in their own worldviews (Jonas, Martens, Niesta Kayser, et.al. 
2008). Theories of populist communication and past studies show that populist parties rely on 
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both social media and appeal to emotion in order to quickly reach a wide audience 
(Gerbaudo 2018). With all of these theories taken into account, one could reasonably expect that 
populist use of communication via social media increases directly following terrorist events. To 
this end, I develop my first hypothesis:  
H1: AfD Tweets about immigration will increase after terrorist events. 
Consistent Language and Increased Emotional Content 
Terror Management Theory and sensemaking theories could also account for changes in 
the emotional content and outlook (positivity or negativity) of Tweets following terrorist events. 
However, I would like to offer up a more nuanced hypothesis, hinging on the characterization of 
the AfD as a nativist party.  
Chapter 9  of the AfD Party Manifesto5, entitled Immigration, Integration, and Asylum, 
characterizes the German system thus far as a failure in protecting the nation-state. “Germany 
has turned into an immigration country without any legal framework” (57).  
It is the AfD’s view that true refugees should be granted shelter as long as there is war in 
the countries of origin. Irregular migrants, who are not persecuted, have no right to claim 
protection, contrary to refugees. Once the reasons for fleeing, such as an end to wars, or political 
and religious persecution, no longer apply, shall residence permits of refugees be terminated. 
These refugees need to leave Germany (58). 
 
Further subsections call for changes to the Law on Repatriation, immigration from poorer 
EU countries, and stricter controls on immigration from non-EU countries. Sections 9.5 and 9.6 
call for greater transparency to the negative consequences of immigration including economic 
costs and crime perpetrated by immigrants.  
                                               
5 The English translation is officially entitled: Manifesto for Germany - The Political Programme of the Alternative 





Chapter 7, “Culture, Language, and Manifesto”, clearly states the AfD’s official views 
towards immigrants are consistently negative. Section 7.2 is entitled “German as Predominant 
Culture Instead of Multiculturalism”, and states:  
The ideology of multiculturalism is blind to history and puts on a par imported cultural 
trends with the indigenous culture, thereby degrading the value system of the latter. The AfD 
views this as a serious threat to social peace and the survival of the nation state as a cultural unit. 
It is the duty of the government and civil society to confidently protect German cultural identity 
as the predominant culture (46). 
 
Section 7.6 Islam and its Tense Relationship with our Value System outlines specific 
incompatibilities with the Islamic religion and inherent German values of society, as defined by 
the party. This section includes statements citing growing Islamic communities as a threat to the 
German state and calls for ending financing for mosques, ending the ability of Islamic 
organizations to hold public body status, and bans on full-body veiling. Further stances against 
immigration within the Party Manifesto include Section 3.9 Protect German Borders, which calls 
for the creation and implementation of a German Border Police,  and Section 6.2 Larger Families 
Instead of Mass Immigration, which cites mass immigration as a potential for conflict and 
detrimental to the national economy.  
In terms of this study, the computer-generated yield for “sentiment” consists of two 
numbers: score and magnitude. My first hypothesis involving sentiment focuses on score. Score 
ranges from -1 (most negative) to 1 (most positive) and indicates the positive or negative content 
within an entity. Due to the explicit negative view towards immigration outlined in the AfD 
Party Manifesto, my hypothesis is as follows: 






  One aspect that cannot be overlooked is the nativism that is present in the AfD’s 
language and platform. The AfD clearly uses negative language in legal documents and in other 
communication in reference to immigration. This leads me to another conclusion that this use of 
negative language would also be consistent within social media communication. 
 H2a: AfD Tweets about immigration will be consistently more negative than Tweets 
about other topics. 
While the previous hypothesis relies on this nativism as an indicator of negative attitude 
towards immigrants, nativism as an indicator of positive attitude towards native Germans, 
German culture, and German identity could also have an impact on the language used in 
immigration-related Tweets. Kai Arzheimer found that “the AfD is unusually prone (by German 
standards) to display national symbols and to emphasize Germany’s national interests” (2015, 
545).  
Terror Management Theory suggests that in times of uncertainty, constituents could 
galvanize around a unifying call of solidarity much like those that a political party could 
plausibly provide in times of national confusion and chaos (Lambert, Scherer, Scott, et.al. 2010). 
As a nativist party, emphasizing German unity, the AfD could be reasonably expected to make 
such an appeal to unification following terrorist events on social media spheres. Therefore, due 
to the emotional appeal to German unification and national identity present both within the Party 
Manifesto, and in accordance with theories of populist communication, I suggest that magnitude 
could be affected by terrorist events.  






 It should be noted that while there is a link between immigration and German identity, 
the purpose of this hypothesis is not to establish that linkage, nor study Tweets focused 
extensively German identity. However, Tweets containing the relevant immigration-related 
words do sometimes contain messages having to do with German identity, and were therefore 






CHAPTER 3: DATA SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 
The data sources for my research are primarily The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) 
from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 
University of Maryland6, and Twitter.   
GTD 
The Global Terrorism Database is self-defined as: “the most comprehensive unclassified 
database of terrorist attacks in the world”. This database provides a multitude of information 
about every terrorist event including, but not limited to, date and location of incident, weapon 
used, nature of target, number of casualties, etc. I generate a comprehensive list of terror events 
used for analysis by filtering for a number of variables. First, I filter for the categorical variable 
“region_txt” Western Europe. This region includes the countries: 
 Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Gibraltar, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Vatican City, West Germany (FRG).  
 
I then filter for the categorical variable “success”. By filtering for a value of 1, this 
ensures that only events that are considered “successful” are included in my data set. I also filter 
for the numeric variable “iyear”, and only include events that occurred in 20137 and later. 
                                               
6This database was first published in 2009, and updated in 2021, by the University of Maryland. The National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism is an Emeritus Center of Excellence of the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security.  
 
7 2013 is the year that the AfD was officially founded. 
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I further filter to generate two separate lists: one referring to major terrorist events, and 
one referring to terrorist events in Germany. The first list includes what I entitle “major terror 
events”. This is filtered by taking the sum of the numeric variables “nkill” and “nwound” and 
create the new numerical variable “ncasualty”. Any event that is coded as 10 or higher for 
“ncasualty” is included. The second list entitled “German terror events” is filtered for the 
categorical variable “country_txt” = Germany. This numeric variable “ncasualty” is created in 
this list as well. Any event that is coded as 1 or higher for “ncasualty” is included in this list. 
In both lists, “ncasualty” is aggregated per year per month to yield a total count for 
deaths and injuries resulting from terrorist events during a specific month of a specific year. The 
independent variable is “month_year” and the dependent variable is “ncasualty_sum”.  
 






I use the Twitter API in order to parse Tweets relevant to immigration, made by AfD 
official accounts8. First, I qwery the Twitter API for relevant Tweets from the time range 2013-
2019 for a given list of twitter handles. These Tweets are then parsed and stored as csv files. 
Then, I parse the file of full tweets and filter for words of interest9. These filtered Tweets are 
then grouped by handle and month, yielding a table that gives a count for how many Tweets are 
tweeted by each account in each month. I also generate a similar set of Tweets that do not 
contain words of interest in order to have control data sets. Here, the script pulls out every 5th 
word to obtain a simple sample that is not representative of the monthly distribution of the 
Tweets. The output is a series of datasets. A singular dataset can be understood as the monthly 
averages of Tweets from a single user, and the relevant filtered Tweets from that user for that 
month. In this analysis, the independent variable is “month_year”, while the dependent variable 
“tweet_count” is used.  
Sentiment Analysis 
I conduct sentiment analysis in two ways. Firstly, I use computer-assisted analysis to determine 
the score and magnitude of each dataset. I take all of the tweets for each given handle, 
consolidate the text of all of their tweets for each month, and then send requests for each set to 
the Google Cloud Language API. This returns a magnitude and sentiment for each Tweet. 
                                               
8 A complete description of scripts used can be found here github.com/ledigiacomo/AfD_research. 
 







Fig. 2 Flowchart illustrating data collection process 
 
The Natural Language Processor from the Google Cloud Language API uses two values 
to measure sentiment: score and magnitude. Score refers to how positive or negative the text of 
the Tweet set is, and will have a corresponding value between the ranges of -1 and 1, with -1 
being the most negative and +1 being the most positive. Magnitude refers to how much 
emotional content is in each Tweet and is scored from 0 to +inf. However, due to the brevity of 
Tweets, this number will most likely fall between 0 and +2. Together, these scores can indicate 
whether the text in a Tweet is positive or negative and how emotionally charged that Tweet is.  
15 
 
Control Variables  
 I generate the dummy variable “has_account”. An entity receives a score of 1 if the user 
had an active Twitter account for that month. An entity receives a score of 0 if the user did not 
have an active Twitter account. All entities with a score of 0 for a given month are dropped from 
analysis during the time frame that the account did not exist. All Tweets from the year 2020 are 
dropped from analysis due to lack of available terrorism data.  
 The datasets generated by the script generate_sample.py are run through both sentiment 
analysis steps in order to create control datasets. Due to the random selection of Tweets, I am 
able to make inferences about whether the characterization of immigration-related Tweets differs 
from the normal sentiment of the user. 
 
Research Design Limitations 
 One of the limitations of the research design is the use of month as a unit of 
measurement. With this design, it is difficult to tell whether a terrorist event is the cause of a 
characteristic change in Tweets or an increase in quantity because it does not account for when in 
the month a specific terrorist event occurred. For example, an increase in immigration-related 
Tweets could occur in the beginning of a month, while a terrorist event could have occured at the 
end, and there would be no way to account for this. Further research into this topic could use a 
different design that would account for this discrepancy by analyzing Tweets made in days after 
a terrorist event.  
16 
 
Another aspect of this research design is the list of filtering words compiled. The list is 
mostly made up of nouns. It was compiled from looking at public statements within Germany 
having to do with immigration, but there was no formal process for collecting these words. A 
more appropriate way of devising such a list could involve parsing Twitter for most commonly 
used words or terms having to do with immigration. This list also tends to trend away from 
economic related terms, which of course is connected to the immigration conversation. Finally, 
this list includes terms that have been specifically constructed or used in the mainstream news by 
the AfD that are derogatory in nature and not used by other parties to refer to immigrants, such 
as Asylant. A different study could analyze only Tweets that contain these words to see if the 






CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
Terrorist Events and Associated Quantity 
 First, I show the frequency of immigration-related Tweets by AfD accounts over a given 
period of time. I then identify a relevant period of time for analysis, based on presence of active 
Twitter accounts, and present graphs that juxtapose these numbers with casualties from terrorist 
events. I conduct regression analysis to determine whether or not there is a correlation between 
these measures. 
 
Fig. 3 shows immigration-related Tweets made by AfD accounts from the years 2013-2019.  
 
Fig. 3 shows noticeable spikes by all accounts in mid-2015. Additionally, the creation of 
some accounts can be seen during this same time period, for instance the account @RLP_AfD. 
There are also significant spikes in activity near the end of 2016. Mid-2017 through the end of 
the year shows significant activity, and this acidity remains volatile until the beginning of 2019. 
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The next graph presented will focus on the years 2015-2019, as many of the analyzed 
accounts did not exist before this period of time. 
 
Fig. 4 shows immigration-related Tweets made by AfD account during the years 2015-2019 juxtaposed with the 
total # of casualties from major terrorist events. 
 
 Fig. 4 adds in the dependent variable casualty_maj_terr to indicate how many 
killed+injured there were in a certain month due to major terror events. However, the spikes in 
activity with immigration-related Tweets do not appear to correlate to the number of casualties 
from major terrorist incidents. There is a visible lack of Tweets mentioning anti-immigration 
following major attacks in 2016, as well as in the beginning of 2017. The major spikes in terror 
casualties in 2015 are due to the attacks in Paris. The spike in May 2017 marks the Manchester 






Fig. 5 shows regression analysis for all immigration-related Tweets made by AfD accounts compared to the sum of 
casualties from major terrorist events. This graph represents the correlation between the years 2013-2019. 
 
 Figure 5 reinforces the notion that there is not a strong correlation between # of casualties 
from major terrorist events and # of immigration-related Tweets. The R-square value is 
incredibly low. Furthermore, the p-value is almost .63, which is far greater than the widely-







Fig. 6 shows immigration-related Tweets made by AfD account during the years 2015-2019 juxtaposed with the 
total # of casualties from terrorist events that occured within Germany. 
 
 Fig. 6 analyzes the frequency of immigration-related Tweets in conjunction with 
casualties from terrorist events that occured within Germany. There does appear to be a slightly 
more of a correlation between casualties from terrorist events in Germany and Tweets revolving 
around immigration. This can be seen in the spikes in both dependent variables in late 2015, mid 
2016, and late 2018. The attack in Berlin in December 2016, is also considered a major terrorist 









Fig. 7 shows regression analysis for all immigration-related Tweets made by AfD accounts compared to the sum of 
casualties from German terrorist events. This graph represents the correlation between the years 2013-2019. 
  
 Overall, Fig. 7 shows that there is an even weaker correlation between overall # of 
immigration-related Tweets and casualties from events that occured within Germany. However, 
there are some accounts that do appear to correlate more than others in previous figures, and that 
holds true when analyzing the regression data10. These results are still statistically insignificant, 
but do suggest that further research, and a different research design could provide more insight. 
 
Based on the above information, I reject H1 on the grounds that major terrorist events  
and German-originated terror events do not statistically alter the frequency of immigration-
related Tweets from AfD accounts. The correlations between the two variables are not strong, 
nor are the results from this study statistically significant, causing a complete rejection of the 
hypothesis. However, some AfD accounts do appear to increase the number of immigration-
related Tweets following terrorist events that occur in Germany, and this could be a line of 
                                               





further questioning.  This would also be in line with much of the research that characterizes the 
AfD as a party that focuses primarily on German identity, nationalism, ethnicity, and threats to 
German homogeneity. 
Terrorist Events and Associated Sentiment 
 Next, I present sentiment data that shows the changing score, and magnitude over the 
relevant period of time in conjunction with casualties from terrorist events to make a number of 
claims about the changing nature of sentiment within these Tweets. In my hypotheses, I offer 
terrorist events as a predictor of increased magnitude, but maintain that score remains consistent 
in regards to immigration-related Tweets. 
 
Fig. 8  shows the score immigration-related Tweets made by AfD account during the years 2015-2019 juxtaposed 
with the total # of casualties from major terrorist events. The red line represents the average score of immigration-






Fig. 9 shows the score immigration-related Tweets made by AfD account during the years 2015-2019 juxtaposed 
with the total # of casualties from terrorist events within Germany. The red line represents the average score of 
immigration-related Tweets from all accounts. 
 
 
 Fig. 8 & Fig. 9 both reveal that the average score of Tweets remains both relatively 
neutral and consistent, fluctuating mostly between 0.023 and 0.024. The low score is to be 
expected due to the lack of content in general contained within a Tweet, but relatively this is still 
a very small range. However, it is notable that the average is consistently in the positive range, 
indicating that Tweets regarding immigration are generally found to be more positive than 
negative in nature. 
There are certain accounts that do tend to have more negative content regarding 
immigration, such as @AfD_Theueringen, @ AfD_Hessen, and @AfD_Bremen. However, it 
should be noted that @AfD_Hessen and @AfD_Bremen also have some of the higher scores, 





the other accounts. This could be potential due to presence of AfD within state parliaments, for 
example, in Thueringen, the AfD holds the second most seats of any party, behind Die Linke. 
The lowest scores from certain accounts seem to correlate with the large period of major terrorist 
attacks in the summer of 2017; however, this does not seem to be a universal trend due to the 
peaks in score for other accounts. German terror attacks appear to have even less of a correlation 
with falling scores, as none of the major dips in score seem to be in line with months during 
which terrorist events occured within Germany. Furthermore, every account saw a rise in scores 
during the summer of 2016 -  the period with the highest number of casualties from terror attacks 
within Germany. 
 
Fig. 10 shows regression analysis for monthly average score of immigration-related Tweets made by AfD accounts 







Fig. 11 shows regression analysis for monthly average score of immigration-related Tweets made by AfD accounts 




 There does not appear to be any major correlation between terrorist events and score, 
according to the regression data11. The R-squared values are incredibly low, and the p-values are 
statistically insignificant. To this end, I conclude that H2, terrorist events will have no noticeable 
impact on the score of Tweets regarding immigration, from AfD handles, is correct in terms of 
average score. This may be reversed when individual accounts are taken into consideration due 
to the parliamentary make-up of each state’s Landtag. 
                                               






Fig. 12 shows the monthly average score of immigration-related Tweets by AfD accounts vs. the monthly average 
score of a random sample of Tweets (not related to immigration) by AfD accounts. 
 
Fig. 12 shows that the average score of immigration-related Tweets is usually lower than 
the average score of Tweets unrelated to immigration. While the two lines can be seen following 
similar trends at times, the immigration-related Tweets still appear to have more negative content 
present than the random sample of Tweets. Therefore,  H2a: The score of Tweets regarding 
immigration, from AfD handles, will be consistently lower than the score of Tweets regarding 






Fig. 13 shows the magnitude immigration-related Tweets made by AfD account during the years 2015-2019 
juxtaposed with the total # of casualties from major terror events. The red line represents the average magnitude of 




Fig. 14 shows the magnitude immigration-related Tweets made by AfD account during the years 2015-2019 
juxtaposed with the total # of casualties from German terror events. The red line represents the average magnitude of 






 Fig. 13 and Fig. 14 show massive discrepancies in emotional content from different 
accounts. @AfD_Hessen and @AfD_MV appear to have some of the highest magnitude scores, 
which do appear to line up with terror events that occur within Germany. In the summer of 2016, 
where there were the most casualties in Germany, there is a general peak in emotional content 
present, but it is not very extreme. Furthermore, many of the terror events within Germany 
during this time period occurred in the state of Bavaria. While this account did see a spike in 
emotional content, it was still relatively low compared to the emotional spikes in the summer of 
2018.  
 In regards to major terror events, there appears to be one noticeable spike that correlates 
to a major terrorist event: the March 2016 attacks in Belgium. This peak in emotional content 
continues through the summer of 2016, which saw the truck incident in Nice, France, as well as 
two significant attacks within Germany. However, it would be erroneous to correlate major terror 
attacks with change in magnitude because of the negative downtrend following the massive 
attacks in Paris in November 2015. Furthermore, there seems to be almost no correlation 
between magnitude and casualties in the first half of 2017, which saw a large number of mass 







Fig. 15 shows regression analysis for monthly average magnitude of immigration-related Tweets made by AfD 
accounts compared to the sum of casualties from major terrorist events. This graph represents the correlation 




Fig. 16 shows regression analysis for monthly average magnitude of immigration-related Tweets made by AfD 
accounts compared to the sum of casualties from German terrorist events. This graph represents the correlation 
between the years 2015-2019. 
 
 However, the regressions disprove H3, the magnitude of Tweets regarding immigration, 
from AfD handles, will increase following terrorist events. Both R-squared values are incredibly 





affected by terrorist events; however, it is not a general trend, and not something that can be 
concluded given this data. It is notable that the R-squared value is higher between # of German 
casualties and immigration-related Tweets than # of casualties from major terrorist events. This 
could be a place for potential further exploration. All of the correlation data from the regressions 
remains statistically insignificant due to the extremely high p-values12. Much like the previous 











                                               
12 See all data in Appendix 3. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 With the rise of populist parties around the world, and the increasing use of social media 
platforms as a battleground for politics, in order to be more informed when making political 
decisions, it is important to understand not only why, but also when and how parties will be most 
likely to use this new sphere of influence. This study was designed to provide insight as to how 
times of crisis, specifically terrorist events, can cause social disarray and heightened emotions 
which can lead to increased susceptibility to political messaging and subversion. Theories of 
populist communication in conjunction with psychological theories of crisis reaction provide a 
foundation for analyzing why terrorist events might prove to be the perfect storm for populist 
parties to advance their political agendas.  
My analysis of immigration-related Tweets indicates that there could be changing 
dynamics in immigration-related messaging following terrorist events, however, my research 
design makes it difficult to uncover this nuance. Primarily, the frequency of immigration-related 
messages and sentiment could be affected. While my research indicates differences between this 
information within immmigration-related Tweets versus other Tweets on a general basis, further 
analysis is needed to pinpoint exactly how terrorist events affect these messages. My research 
rejects most of the hypotheses that frequency and sentiment are correlated with # of casualties 
from immigration-related Tweets on the grounds of insignificant statistical regressions. 
One interesting finding is that many of the AfD accounts within the study were made 
active in the months immediately following the Paris attacks of 2015. This not only suggests that 
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social media usage massively upticked due to social need to make sense of the state of 
fear and confusion, but also would have bearing on all of the data following. My research offers 
many new questions for further investigation, among the most important being: Why are some 
AfD accounts more reactive to terror events than others? Is geographical proximity to terror 
events important or is parliamentary make-up of state government an important factor? And what 
other notable events could account for any of the analyzed trends? For example, major upticks in 
frequency of Tweets, heightened emotional content, etc., that do not necessarily correlate with 
terror events could be caused by other traceable events, like the 2017 Bundestag elections. Many 
of these questions could also be better explored with a research design that better accounted for 
the timing of terrorist events within a month in relation to when in a month certain Tweets were 
made. For example, if a terrorist attack happened in the middle of a month with a high number of 
relevant Tweets, a research design that accounted for whether Tweets were made before or after 
the event would be able to determine whether these were related in any way or merely 
coincidental. 
Another point of interest would be a further analysis of sentiment that could better 
account for changes in negativity and emotional content of small entities, like Tweets. Google’s 
Natural Language Processor offers “Entity Sentiment Analysis”, which functions much like the 
sentiment analysis used in my research, but focuses specifically on the sentiment of nouns and 
proper nouns within a text. This method of analysis may be better primed to account for the 
harsher language used by the AfD in reference to immigrants (Klikauer 2018). Finally, one last 
line of questioning could be to analyze how the AfD talks about German nationalism following 
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major terrorist events. My research touches on this due to the overlap in data between 
identity-related Tweets and immigration-related Tweets, but fails to elaborate. My data often 
shows spikes in positive emotional content following major terrorist attacks, indicating that 
perhaps the political messaging following terrorist events is focused more on the positives of a 
homogenous German culture rather than more negatively-toned messaging about immigration.  
It should be noted that my data range covers only AfD accounts from the federal states 
plus the official accounts of the “AfD”, “AfD im Bundestag” and “AfD im EU-Parlament”; 
however, this does not mean that they all are the most popular, nor have the largest number of 
followers. Major cities also have relevant accounts that could have been added to this study. The 
time range of this study is only up to date to 2019, due to the availability of data on the GTD. 
More current studies would have significant variances in data due to the 2021 federal elections, 
and the 2020 Coronavirus pandemic, which one could reasonably assume affects the political 













Appendix 1: List of Twitter Handles and Users 
Figure 17 
Account Name Handle 
Alternative für Deutschland @AfD 
AfD-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag @AfDimBundestag 
AfD im EU-Parlament @AfDimEUParl 
AfD Bayern @AfD_Bayern 
AfD Berlin @AfDBerlin 
AfD-Fraktion Brandenburg @AfD_FraktionBB 
AfD Bremen @AfD_Bremen 
AfD Hamburg @AfD_Hamburg 
AfD Hessen @AfD_Hessen 
AfD MV @AfD_MV 
AfD NWR @AlternativeNRW 
AfD Rheinland-Pfalz @RLP_AfD 
AfD Saarland @AfDSaar 
AfD-Fraktion Sachsen @AfD_SLT 
AfD Sachsen-Anhalt @AfD_LSA 
AfD Schleswig-Holstein @AfD_LV_SH 













































































Appendix 3: Regression Statistics 
 






vs. # OF TWEETS     
Handle(s) R-Squared p-value Note 
sum of all handles 0.004041 0.629412  
@AfD 0.001669 0.756613  
@AfDimEUParl 0.038314 0.421919 from Jun 2018 
@AfD_Bayern 0.005198 0.5841  
@AfD_Berlin 0.072185 0.037923  
@AfD_Bremen 0.000274 0.900121  
@AfD_Hessen 0.089943 0.019909  
@AfD_MV 0.020185 0.278868  
@AfD_RLP 0.000289 0.904786 from Sep 2015 
@AfD_LSA 0.035714 0.155389 from Mar 2015 
@AfD_LV_SH 0.025326 0.274739 from Dec 2015 

























vs. NUMBER OF 
TWEETS    
Handle(s) R-Squared p-value Note 
sum of all handles 0.001217 0.791283  
@AfD 0.001429 0.77429  
@AfDimEUParl 0.049761 0.358629 from Jun 2018 
@AfD_Bayern 0.016532 0.327537  
@AfD_Berlin 0.025484 0.223082  
@AfD_Bremen 0.001157 0.796406  
@AfD_Hessen 0.018872 0.295236  
@AfD_MV 0.001367 0.779116  
@AfD_RLP 0.007814 0.533173 from Sep 2015 
@AfD_LSA 0.038174 0.141616 from Mar 2015 
@AfD_LV_SH 0.041922 0.158172 from Dec 2015 











REGRESSIONS - major 
terror   
Handle(s) R-Squared p-value 
average of all handles 0.000565 0.85692 
@AfD 0.001669 0.756613 
@AfDimEUParl 0.00423 0.621526 
@AfD_Bayern 0.002588 0.699482 
@AfD_Berlin 0.001481 0.770361 
@AfD_Bremen 0.003381 0.659003 
@AfD_Hessen 0.002368 0.711941 
@AfD_MV 0.016296 0.331043 
@AfD_RLP 0.002234 0.719899 
@AfD_LSA 0.024506 0.2323 
@AfD_LV_SH 0.020725 0.27247 

















German terror   
Handle(s) R-Squared p-value 
average of all handles 0.006226 0.549003 
@AfD 0.001429 0.77429 
@AfDimEUParl 0.0028 0.688 
@AfD_Bayern 0.001712 0.753614 
@AfD_Berlin 0.003182 0.668583 
@AfD_Bremen 0.001102 0.801167 
@AfD_Hessen 0.000155 0.924785 
@AfD_MV 0.062582 0.053883 
@AfD_RLP 0.000666 0.844784 
@AfD_LSA 0.014538 0.358799 
@AfD_LV_SH 0.01004 0.446222 













major terror   
Handle(s) R-Squared p-value 
average of all handles 1.25E-06 0.993234 
@AfD 0.001669 0.756613 
@AfDimEUParl 0.007588 0.508089 
@AfD_Bayern 0.000809 0.829245 
@AfD_Berlin 0.015656 0.340811 
@AfD_Bremen 0.000447 0.872655 
@AfD_Hessen 0.001236 0.789722 
@AfD_MV 0.02366 0.24063 
@AfD_RLP 0.003328 0.661539 
@AfD_LSA 0.01926 0.290284 
@AfD_LV_SH 0.064428 0.050354 



























german terror   
Handle(s) R-Squared p-value 
average of all handles 0.011599 0.412757 
@AfD 0.001429 0.77429 
@AfDimEUParl 0.005048 0.58956 
@AfD_Bayern 0.001052 0.805626 
@AfD_Berlin 0.048357 0.091361 
@AfD_Bremen 0.003746 0.64224 
@AfD_Hessen 0.011334 0.41817 
@AfD_MV 0.022958 0.247817 
@AfD_RLP 0.013099 0.383888 
@AfD_LSA 0.025289 0.224884 
@AfD_LV_SH 0.055818 0.069161 
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